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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The District Court Abused its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hulse's
Rule 35 Motion and Request for Leave.

In his Opening Brief, Mr. Hulse set forth how the district court abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 35 motion and request for leave because the manner by which the district court
did so was not an exercise of sound reason. As Mr. Hulse explained, simply writing "Denied
3/2/2011" on the face of Mr. Hulse's motion without any justification whatsoever created a
record that lacks any evidence showing the district court recognized the decision before it as one
left to its discretion or that the district court reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. In
response, the State argues the district court is not required to state on the record its reasons for
denying a defendant's Rule 35 motion because it is the defendant's burden to create an adequate
record for review. Respondent's Brief, p.3. The State also argues the district court did not
unduly limit the information it would consider when it denied Mr. Hulse's request for leave to
supplement his motion because he should have made an offer of proof showing what evidence he
intended to provide. Respondent's Brief, p.3.
It is undisputed and both parties agree that when a sentence is within its statutory limits a
motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a reduction of the sentence is a plea for leniency and is reviewed
on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397,400
(2007). Moreover, Mr. Hulse acknowledges that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). This however does not alleviate the district court

from soundly exercising its reason when ruling upon such motions. The district court must still
perceive the issue as one of discretion and act within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any applicable legal standards. State v. Izaguirre, l 45 Idaho 820,

165 P.3d

273, 282 (2007).
Here, the question is whether the district court's denial of Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion by
just writing "denied" on the face of the motion was an exercise of sound discretion. In doing so
the district court, not Mr. Hulse, created a situation where there is no record of the reasoning
employed by the district court. The State nevertheless argues Mr. Hulse bears the burden of
creating an adequate record on review. In support of its argument the State cites to State v.
Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804,919 P.2d 333 (1996).

In Mowrey, the defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his
conviction of lewd conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen from a felony to a
misdemeanor under Idaho Code§ 19-2604. A1owrey, 128 Idaho at 805, 919 P.2d at 334. On
appeal Mowrey argued that making relief available to some people convicted of other types of
sex offenses against children under section 19-2604, while precluding him and others similarly
situated, violated the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. id.
The Mowrey Court affirmed the district court's decision denying the defendant's motion.
In doing so the Court of Appeals noted there was no indication in the record that Mowrey had
challenged the constitutionality of section 19-2604 at the district court level. Id. Moreover, the
record did not establish whether the district court denied Mowrey relief because of the express
language in section 19-2604 prohibiting such relief or whether it disregarded the statute and
denied the motion on the merits. Id. As a result the Afowrey Court stated it would not "speculate
as to the reasons for the district court's decision" and reiterated that the appellant has the burden
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of providing an adequate record on appeal. Id.
What is unknown in Mowrey is whether the inadequate record on appeal was the result of
the appellant's failure to provide the appellate court with a complete record or whether the
inadequate record on appeal resulted from the district court's unilateral actions. To the extent
that Mowrey supporis the proposition that criminal defendant's are always required to provide an
adequate record on appeal regardless of the district court's actions, then lvfowrey is
distinguishable from Mr. Hulse's case. Alternatively, J\1owrey was decided in error.
Simply writing "denied" on the face of a motion without any explanation or
acknowledgment of exercised discretion effectively insulates a district court's decision from
appellate review. Should trial courts be permitted to adopt this practice, it effectively deprives
appellate courts of their ability to review their judgments. Moreover, as long as trial court's are
permitted to insulate their rulings from appellate review, criminal defendants will be deprived of
important appellate rights.
As was the case here, without a hearing Mr. Hulse was unable to request an explanation
of the district court's decision. In such circumstances trial courts must be required to at a
minimum provide enough explanation or analysis establishing that it recognized the issue as one
of discretion and that it reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. It would be unjust to
hold that criminal defendant bear the burden of providing the appellate court with the district
court's rationale for review when there is no means for a defendant to obtain it. A criminal
defendant cannot be held responsible for an inadequate appellate record when the trial court's
actions preclude him from providing one.
Finally, the district court also abused its discretion by unduly limiting the information it
would consider before ruling upon Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion. As explained in Mr. Hulse's

Opening Brief, when \ifr. Hulse filed his Rule 35 motion he also requested leave "in order to
further supplement the motion with supporting documentation and/or other evidence." CR. 53.
'fhis request was likely made because Mr. Hulse's counsel understood that he would be required
to provide new or additional information in support of his request for leniency. See State v.

Huffinan, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007). 1\evertheless the district court denied
his request ft1r more time to supplement the record without explanation.
The State argues Mr. Hulse should have made an offer of proof as to what evidence he
wished to present in support of his Rule 35 motion. Respondent's Brief, pp. 3-4. Though Mr.
Hulse did not provide an offer of proof providing the district court with the substance of what
new or additional information he intended to support his Rule

motion with, Mr. Hulse

nonetheless put the district court on notice that he did in fact intend to provide new or additional
information. Thus, when the district court denied Mr. Hulse's request for leave to further
supplement his motion, the denial was an impermissible limitation on the information it would
consider in deciding the motion. See State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 693 P.2d 1097, 1100
(Ct. App. 1984).
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lll. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Hulse's Opening Brief, this Court should
reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion and remand the matter
allowing the district court to properly exercise its sound discretion in determining whether
leniency is warranted in this case.
Respectfr1lly submitted this

J.l__ day of February, 2012.

-

Attorney for Stacey Hulse
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